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Abstract 
We analyze how digital platforms can increase the survival rate of firms during a crisis by 
providing continuity in access to customers. Using order-level data from Uber Technologies, we 
study how the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing shutdown of businesses in the United States 
affected independent, small business restaurant supply and demand on the Uber Eats platform. 
We find evidence that small restaurants experience significant increases in total activity, orders 
per day, and orders per hour following the closure of the dine-in channel, and that these increases 
may be due to both demand-side and supply-side shocks. We document an increase in the 
intensity of competitive effects following the shock, showing that growth in the number of 
providers on a platform induces both market expansion and heightened inter-provider 
competition. Our findings underscore the critical role that digital will play in creating business 
resilience in the post-COVID economy, and provide new managerial insight into how       
supply-side and demand-side factors shape business performance on a platform.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The restaurant business is among the industries most acutely impacted by the COVID crisis. As 
cities and states initiated shelter-in-place orders and consumers pulled back their presence in 
public spaces, restaurants that rely exclusively or primarily on dine-in (serving consumers face-
to-face) have been especially affected. Numbers from the Advance Monthly Retail Trade Survey 
by the U.S. Census Bureau indicate a 48.7% year-over-year decline for food services and 
drinking places (NAICS 722) in April 2020, reflecting revenue losses of over $30 billion that 
month alone, and of over $50 billion in March and April 2020 (US Census Bureau Monthly and 
Annual Retail Trade, 2020). According to the National Restaurant Association, the average 
establishment saw a 78% decline in its revenues in the first 10 days of April 2020 compared to 
the same period in April 2019, and revenue losses over the month are projected to exceed $50 
billion (Grindy, 2020).  
Within the restaurant industry, small businesses have been especially vulnerable to this crisis. 
While larger restaurant chains may have the resources to weather a prolonged economic 
downturn, independent establishments and mom-and-pop restaurants may struggle to stay alive 
as revenues fall, and it is believed that up to 75% of independent restaurants closed during the 
pandemic may not survive the crisis (Severson and Yaffe-Bellany, 2020). Further, independent 
restaurants are more heavily impacted by recessions and economic shocks than the larger 
national chains as they have limited access to credit and alternative financing options during such 
crises (Dietrich, Schneider, and Stocks, 2020). The unfavorable economic environment will thus 
further exacerbate the credit constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) that typically disadvantage 
small businesses. 
Faced with the current crisis, restaurants have been forced to utilize alternative channels to reach 
customers, maintain revenue, and stay alive. A bright spot for some restaurants has been the 
growth of access to alternative digital channels over the last few years. For an independent 
restaurant, food delivery platforms like Uber Eats and Doordash can now make the difference 
between survival and shutdown. Our study takes a close look at the economic effects of access to 
this platform-enabled channel during the COVID-19 shutdown in March and April 2020.  
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Figure 1: Year-over-Year Percent Change in Seated Diners in Response to the COVID-19 
Pandemic 
 
Note: Illustrates the year-over-year percent change in seated diners at restaurants on the OpenTable network in the 
United States The dashed line represents March 16.  
Prior research has explored the challenges and opportunities that such alternative distribution 
channels pose to incumbent firms that have traditionally operated in different markets (e.g., 
Chen, Hu, and Smith, 2019a; Danaher et al., 2010; Smith and Telang, 2009).  For example, 
Airbnb is now an increasingly important channel, not just for sharing one’s spare bedroom or 
apartment, but also for bed-and-breakfasts and full-time vacation rental properties (Guttentag, 
2015). Similarly, e-commerce platforms such as eBay and Amazon.com are increasingly 
important for small businesses and individual sellers (Bailey et al., 2008).  
These digital distribution channels that have ended up being a source of small business resilience 
exhibit different characteristics than traditional markets, altering the nature of competition in 
markets (Farronato and Fradkin, 2018; Hall and Krueger, 2018; Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 
2017). Such changes provide opportunities for businesses that may struggle in other market 
settings. On the supply side, platforms and digital distribution channels lower the costs of entry 
for small providers, enabling smaller providers to reach buyers more easily and providing them 
with flexibility (Chen et al., 2019b; Einav, Farronato, and Levin, 2016). Digital markets greatly 
reduce the costs of consumer search and discovery using recommendation tools that leverage 
large data on consumer behavior with a wide inventory of products (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and 
Simester, 2011; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan, 2012). In conjunction with the decreased 
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costs of maintaining inventory and the ability to aggregate demand across a wider consumer 
base, such recommendation and search tools create a market in which “niche” offerings can find 
an audience and thrive (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al., 2006, 2011; Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan, 2012; Zhang, 2018).  
Building on such work, we analyze and document the stabilizing and sustaining effects of food 
delivery platforms in the weeks following the shutdown in the United States due to the COVID-
19 pandemic in mid-March 2020. We use order-level data from the Uber Eats food delivery 
platform for five major US cities (New York City, San Francisco, Atlanta, Miami, and Dallas) 
from February 1st 2020 through May 1st 2020 to examine changes in restaurant demand and 
performance on the Uber Eats platform following the shutdown. We find evidence that small 
restaurants take advantage of the online on-demand channel to partially offset the revenue losses 
from shuttering their dine-in channel. Across our five sample cities, we see a sharp increase in 
the rate at which new restaurants join the Uber Eats platform. In addition, we see that restaurants 
that remain open for delivery appear to experience significant and economically meaningful 
increases in the count of orders that they receive.  
This increase in orders exists despite the fact that many restaurants have cut the number of hours 
that they supply on the platform. Probing deeper, our analysis reveals that the impact of the 
COVID-induced economic shock has many facets which collectively influence observed changes 
in restaurant demand and performance. There is a demand-side shock comprised of many parts 
with countervailing effects: the absence of dine-in options may shift demand towards the online 
channel; variability in the availability of groceries and fears of going to a grocery store may 
induce consumers to order in rather than cook themselves; an increase in the hours people have 
been spending at home coupled with health concerns associated with food prepared and 
delivered by people outside their homes could induce an increased propensity and ability to 
prepare one’s own meals. More saliently, there is also a supply-side shock induced by the 
shuttering of many restaurants, the cutting back of operating hours for those that remain open, 
and the greater availability of resources to dedicate to the delivery side of operations as dine-in 
dries up.  
Our analysis of the competitive effects of this supply-side shock reveals that the intensity of 
competitive effects (as measured by the percent of restaurants within a cuisine categorization that 
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remain open on a given day) have grown following the shock. As one might expect, the 
performance of an individual restaurant on the Uber Eats platform is better when a larger fraction 
of its competitors (defined as those in the same city offering the same cuisine) are closed. 
However, overall demand on the platform is larger when more restaurants are open. These dual 
effects of market expansion and substitution suggest an interesting tension between what is 
optimal for the platform and what is optimal for the complementors hosted on the platform.  
Our work contributes to multiple streams of literature. Over the last decade, the emergence of 
platforms has spawned a growing body of literature that focuses on the strategy and performance 
of the firms that create and organize the platforms (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Cennamo and Santalo, 
2013; Eisenmann, Parker, and Alstyne, 2011; Tucker and Zhang, 2010; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). 
However, much less attention has been paid to understanding the performance and strategy of 
providers on digital markets, despite the fact that such providers are critical to value creation and 
represent the vast majority of firms within a platform ecosystem (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). 
Our work aims to fill that gap by showing how digital channels can stabilize firm performance 
when other distribution channels are limited.  
By showing that digital channels can serve as a substitute when traditional brick-and-mortar 
settings are disrupted, we contribute to the body of research that examines cannibalization and 
opportunities from alternative digital distribution channels (Chen et al., 2019a; Danaher et al., 
2010; Deleersnyder et al., 2002; Smith and Telang, 2009). Further, by exploring the moderating 
effect of competition on performance on the digital platform, we add to a body of literature that 
explores substitution and spillovers in the sharing economy (Sundararajan, 2016) and on digital 
platform markets (Haviv, Huang, and Li, 2020; Reshef, 2019). Lastly, by highlighting the dual 
effects of market expansion and business stealing, we contribute to literature that discusses the 
tension between strategies that are optimal for the platform and strategies that are optimal for 
complementors hosted on the platform (e.g., Filippas, Jagabathula, and Sundararajan, 2019; 
Venkatraman and Lee, 2004; Zhu and Liu, 2018). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical setting. Section 3 
outlines our data and provides some preliminary model-free results.  Section 4 provides our 
models, their results, and discusses their implications. Section 5 concludes and outlines 
directions for additional inquiry.  
   
 
 
 
6 
2. EMPIRICAL SETTING  
The focus of our study is on how digital channels can substitute for brick-and-mortar sales when 
traditional channels are disrupted.  We take advantage of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, 
also known as the coronavirus pandemic, that began at the end of 2019. The pandemic has 
involved the outbreak of a viral infection that can cause acute respiratory issues in affected 
individuals (Liu, Kuo, and Shih, 2020). The virus was first identified in December 2019 in 
Wuhan, China, and has since then spread across the world, resulting in a global pandemic (Hui et 
al., 2020). The virus is primarily transmitted through close contact and is highly contagious (Liu 
et al., 2020).  
As of June 11, 2020, more than 7.4 million cases have been reported resulting in greater than 
420,000 deaths (COVID-19 Map, 2020), and there are no vaccines, drugs, or medicines that 
demonstrably prevent or cure the disease (WHO Q&A on Coronavirus, 2020). Accordingly, 
countries across the world have adopted dramatic non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent 
the spread and transmission of the virus. Across the United States, states and cities have 
requested or required that residents avoid any non-essential travel or activity (Mervosh, Lu, and 
Swales, 2020). Such “stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders have devastated economies, 
leading to rising unemployment rates, falling consumer activity, and stifled growth (Lee, 2020).  
As discussed earlier, the restaurant industry is among the most acutely impacted, and we see 
dramatic changes in consumer and supplier behavior on alternative distribution channels in 
response to these interventions, as illustrated in Figure 2. Panel A shows how consumer sessions 
with demand intent have increased post-shutdown across our five sample cities, with an increase 
in average daily consumer activity that ranges from 25% in Miami to nearly 75% in San 
Francisco.  
In Figure 2, Panel B, we show the monthly average number of SMB restaurants that joined the 
Uber Eats platform in the months prior to and following the onset of the pandemic. Relative to 
February 2020, across the five cities, signups increased by 128% in March 2020 and by 51% in 
April 2020. Among our five cities, in March 2020 compared to February 2020, Atlanta displayed 
the largest single-city increase — by 492% or a 5.92x increase, while San Francisco displayed 
the largest within-city increase — by 107% or a 2.07x increase in April 2020 relative to February 
2020. Signups slowed in April 2020 relative to March 2020, except in San Francisco, which saw 
a 1.91x increase in March 2020 and a 1.09x increase in April 2020 relative to March. 
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Figure 2: Consumer and Supplier Activity in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic on the 
Uber Eats Platform 
 
A. Consumer Sessions with Demand Intent 
 
 
B. Monthly Rate of SMB Restaurants joining the Uber Eats platform 
 
 
Note: In Panel A, the dotted curves plot the daily number of consumer sessions with demand intent between 
February 1 and May 1 across our five cities, normalized in a way that makes the average pre-lockdown value equal 
to 1. The dashed vertical line represents the day on which the shelter-in-place guidance was issued. The solid 
horizontal lines depict the average daily number of consumer sessions with demand intent in the pre-lockdown and 
post-lockdown time windows. The differences in averages pre- and post- are statistically significant in each of our 
cities. In Panel B, the first four bars depict the monthly average number of restaurants that joined Uber Eats in 2016, 
2017, 2018 and 2019. The next four bars depict the actual number of restaurants that joined Uber Eats in the first 
four months of 2020. 
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3. DATA AND MODEL-FREE ANALYSIS 
 We rely on data from the Uber Eats platform, a digital food service delivery platform offered by 
the ridesharing company Uber. Consumers can review menus and order food for delivery or 
takeout from participating restaurants using an application provided by the platform or through a 
web browser. In exchange for hosting the transaction and connecting consumers to restaurants, 
Uber Eats collects a commission on the orders placed on the platform from restaurants and 
collects delivery charges from customers.  
We use order-level data to examine how restaurant demand and performance on the Uber Eats 
platform changes following the shutdown. Our sample consists of activity on all “Small or 
Medium Business” (SMB) restaurants, defined as restaurant chains with 50 or fewer locations on 
the Uber Eats platform, across five major US cities (New York City, San Francisco, Atlanta, 
Miami, and Dallas) from February 1st 2020 through May 1st 2020. A vast majority of these 
restaurants (90% of the SMBs in our sample) have just a single location. We measure restaurant 
demand and performance using the daily count of orders a restaurant receives.1  
To identify the effect of the closure of dine-in restaurants on restaurant performance on the Uber 
Eats platform, we take advantage of the enactment of shelter-in-place guidance in each of our 
five sample cities. For each city, we define a “pre-lockdown” and “post-lockdown” period 
depending on the date the city enacted shelter-in-place guidance (for all cities, this occurred in 
mid-March 2020). For example, for New York City, the pre-shutdown period comprises the days 
February 1 through March 16, and the post-lockdown period comprises the days March 17 
through May 1. Table 1 summarizes.2  
 
 
 
 
 
1 Because of the proprietary nature of the Uber Eats data, we are limited in the outcome measures we can consider at 
part of this research study, and do not have access to restaurant revenues or order sizes.  
2 Dallas and Miami prohibited in-restaurant dining a week before instating shelter-in-place guidance. We use the 
shelter-in-place guidance for pre- and post-dates in these cities for consistency. Results are robust to using the date 
of restaurant closure as well.  
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Table 1: Pre- and Post-Lockdown Periods by Sample City 
City Pre-Lockdown Period Post-Lockdown Period 
Atlanta3 February 1 – March 23 March 24 – May 1 
Dallas4 February 1 – March 23 March 24 – May 1 
Miami5 February 1 – March 23 March 24 – May 1 
New York City6 February 1 – March 16 March 17 – May 1 
San Francisco7 February 1 – March 16 March 17 – May 1 
Note: Date ranges are inclusive. Pre- and post-lockdown dates are defined by the date that the city announced 
“shelter-in-place” or “stay-at-home” guidance.  
 
For data anonymity purposes as well as to ease interpretation of coefficients, order counts at the 
restaurant-day level are scaled by the pre-period mean count of daily orders across all restaurants 
within the city. This scaling will later allow us to interpret our coefficients as percentage changes 
in daily orders relative to pre-period activity levels within the city. 
In an ideal natural experiment, we would have a set of control cities that were unaffected by the 
pandemic.8 Unfortunately, the pandemic has affected nearly all major cities across the globe, and 
we do not have an appropriate sample of control cities. Nevertheless, even though limited to just 
comparing within-city changes pre-lockdown vs. post-lockdown, we believe that the exogenous 
nature of the global pandemic provide clear insights into how a change in the availability of a 
traditional channels affects supply and demand through alternative digital channels. In general, 
all our analysis compares outcomes post-lockdown with outcomes pre-lockdown. We provide 
each model specification at the appropriate point in the following section  
 
 
3 https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/atlantas-latest-coronavirus-updates-tuesday-march-24/ 
4 
https://static.texastribune.org/media/files/ed4763065cc11702a343bbaa3e67570b/Dallas%20County%20Shelter%20i
n%20Place.pdf?_ga=2.204951833.80763332.1590860856-1233562438.1590098631 
5 https://www.miamigov.com/Notices/News-Media/City-of-Miami-Orders-Residents-to-Shelter-in-Place 
6 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/nyregion/new-york-coronavirus.html 
7 https://www.sfdph.org/dph/alerts/files/HealthOrderC19-07-%20Shelter-in-Place.pdf 
8 For example, if such a set of control cities existed, we could use a difference-in-differences identification strategy 
to evaluate the causal impact of restaurant closure by comparing trends from the pre-period to the post-period for 
treatment vs. control cities. 
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Figure 3: Changes in Total Daily Orders on the Uber Eats Platform in Response to the 
COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Note: The figure displays the daily number of orders fulfilled by restaurants between February 1 and May 1 across 
our five cities.  The dashed vertical line represents the day on which the shelter-in-place guidance was issued. The 
solid horizontal lines depict the average daily number of completed orders in the pre-lockdown and post-lockdown 
time windows.  
 
Before proceedings to our main results, we first provide model-free evidence aligned with the 
demand-side and supply-side shocks discussed in the introductory section. First, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, following the lockdown, all five cities experienced an increase in the total number of 
Uber Eats orders placed across all restaurants. The average total number of orders per day was 
significantly higher in the post-lockdown period across all cities except New York City, with the 
highest difference in San Francisco (51.2%, p < 0.01) and the lowest difference in New York 
City (3.1%, p = 0.27). 
What is especially interesting is that these increases in total daily orders have occurred despite 
widespread restaurant shutdowns and cutbacks on operating hours. Many restaurants have 
shuttered entirely, either temporarily or permanently. Of those that remain, many have cut back 
on the number of hours they operate because of the dramatic decrease in on-site dining activity. 
As illustrated by Figure 4, following the lockdown, all five cities witnessed a substantial 
reduction in both the number of restaurants open for business on the platform (Panel A) and the 
average number of supply hours (Panel B).  
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When we say that a restaurant “offers supply hours,” we mean that the restaurant indicated to the 
Uber Eats platform at some point during the day that is was available to take orders. Restaurants 
have the ability to mark themselves as available or unavailable to order from on the Uber Eats 
platform; the platform then logs data on the windows of available time. We quantify the 
windows of time that a restaurant indicates availability in this manner by measuring, for each 
restaurant on each day, its number of supply hours.  For example, on a given day, if a restaurant 
indicates availability between 12:00pm and 4:30pm and then again between 6:30pm and 
10:00pm, this corresponds to the restaurant having eight supply hours on that day.   
The decrease in the number of restaurants open for delivery was greatest in New York City 
(38%, p<0.01) and most modest in San Francisco (7%, t-stat = 6.25, p < 0.01). The decrease in 
the number of supply hours from restaurants that remained open was fairly consistent across all 
cities (ranging from -6.2% to –9.0%). Thus, the net drop in supply is quite profound across cities, 
and perhaps most dramatic in New York City, where the total daily supply hours post-shutdown 
is, on average, at barely half the pre-shutdown level. There are many factors that could be 
causing this precipitous drop, including restaurants ceasing operations (either temporarily or 
permanently), and those that remain open for take-out and delivery cutting back on operating 
hours because of the loss of dine-in customers. A comparison between Figure 4, Panel A and 
Figure 4, Panel B indicates that both these factors are at play. In NYC, it appears that the supply 
squeeze is driven largely by restaurants closing down, while in SF, it appears that cutbacks in 
operating hours accounts for most of the decline in supply. 
In combination, these supply-side effects indicate a very substantial decrease in the effective 
total daily number of supply hours in a city. As illustrated in Figure 5, with the sustained 
increase in ordering through the platform, this has resulted in a dramatic increase in order 
velocity (number of orders fulfilled per available supply hour) across all five cities.  
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Figure 4: Supply-Side Response to COVID-19 Pandemic on the Uber Eats Platform 
 
A. Number of Open Restaurants. 
 
 
B. Average Daily Supply Hours for Open Restaurants. 
 
Note: In Panel A, the dotted curves plot the average number of restaurants that offer at least one hour of supply on 
the Uber Eats platform on any given day. In Panel B, the dotted curves plot the average number of daily supply 
hours per restaurant, only counting restaurants that offer supply on the Uber Eats platform on any given day. In both 
charts, the solid horizontal lines depict the average in the pre-lockdown and post-lockdown windows. The 
differences in pre-lockdown and post-lockdown averages are statistically significant in each of our cities. 
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Figure 5: Changes in Order Velocity on the Uber Eats Platform in Response to the 
COVID-19 Pandemic  
 
 
Note: The dotted curves plot the daily number of orders/supply hour (normalized velocity) fulfilled by restaurants 
between February 1 and May 1 across our five cities, normalized in a way that makes the average pre-lockdown 
value equal to 1.  The solid horizontal lines depict the average normalized velocity in the pre-lockdown and post-
lockdown time windows. The differences in averages pre-lockdown and post-lockdown values are statistically 
significant in each of our cities.  
 
Put differently, the simultaneous increases in demand and decreases in supply have dramatically 
raised the rate at which active restaurants are receiving and fulfilling orders post-pandemic.  The 
velocity increases are most dramatic in New York City and Dallas, where on average, restaurants 
that were still operating post-lockdown have more than doubled the number of orders they are 
fulfilling per available hour, but are by no means small in other cities: close to double in San 
Francisco, 71% higher in Miami and 69% higher in Atlanta. 
Finally, we investigate the overall relationship between supply and demand, that is, the number 
of restaurants offering supply in a city on any given day, and the total number of order placed in 
that city on that day. This is summarized in Figure 6. Not surprisingly, an increase in supply is 
corelated with a net expansion in demand. While this is clearly positive for the platform, the 
impacts of supply expansion on the providers is not immediately clear, and we explore its 
competitive effects towards the end of Section 4.  
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Figure 6: Open Restaurants and Completed Orders on the Uber Eats Platform  
 
 
Note: The dots plot the relationship between the count of restaurants offering supply in a city on a given day and the 
total count of completed orders within the city on that same day. The solid lines plot a simple linear relationship 
between restaurant supply and completed orders at the city-day level.  
 
4. MODEL AND RESULTS  
Our model-free analysis reveals significant increases in total transaction activity coupled with a 
fairly dramatic change in the supply landscape. The analysis that follows aims to better 
understand restaurant-level impacts, towards unpacking the effects that the availability of the 
digital channel has on SMB restaurants. We quantify this impact by focusing on one key 
dependent variable – the daily number of orders received by a restaurant. While acknowledging 
that daily revenue would have been an informative metric, confidentiality concerns precluded the 
analysis of this measure.  
4.1 Baseline model: Impact of lockdown on digital orders 
Our first model assumes the following form: 𝑌!" = 𝛽#𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!" + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	𝐹𝐸! + 𝐷𝑎𝑦	𝑜𝑓	𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘	𝐹𝐸" + 𝜀        (1) 
In this equation, i indexes the restaurant and t indexes the date. Y is the count of orders a 
restaurant receives in a day, our dependent variable, and Post is the main independent variable 
which indicates whether or not the city has enacted a shelter-in-place order on a given day. Post 
is equal to zero on all pre-lockdown days and is equal to one in all post-lockdown days.  
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Table 2: Regression Estimate of the Change in Daily Restaurant Orders on the Uber Eats 
Platform in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Note: The table presents regression results that assess the impact of shutdown orders on daily order counts on the 
Uber Eats platform. The variable Post takes the value 0 for all observations February 1 through the declaration of 
shelter-in-place guidance in a given city, and the value 1 for all observations following the declaration of shelter-in-
place guidance through May 1. The data set in Column 1 is a balanced panel consisting of all restaurants that offered 
supply on at least one day between February 1 through May 1. The data set in Column 2 is an unbalanced panel 
consisting of only those restaurant-days for which the restaurant offered positive supply on that day. The dependent 
variable is scaled by the within-city pre-period mean. Both regressions use fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by restaurant and by day-of-week.  
 
To account for restaurant-specific heterogeneity that may drive our result (including restaurant 
popularity, cuisine, and the choice of whether or not to remain open for delivery following the 
shelter-in-place order) we include restaurant fixed effects. We also include day-of-week fixed 
effects to account for any cyclical variation in order density. 
In Table 2, we present results from the regression analysis examining the effect of the shelter-in-
place orders and subsequent dine-in restaurant shutdown on orders on the Uber Eats platform. In 
Column 1, the sample includes all restaurants that offered some positive level of supply 
(availability to take orders) on Uber Eats platform in the pre-lockdown or post- lockdown period. 
In Column 2, we focus on days on which a restaurant remains active on Uber Eats and display 
results for a sample of all restaurant-days for which a restaurant offers supply on the Uber Eats 
platform. 
In both samples, we find that restaurants receive significantly more orders in the post-period than 
in the pre-period, even controlling for restaurant and day-of-week fixed effects. In Column 1, in 
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the sample of all restaurants that offered supply in either the pre- or post-period, we find that 
restaurants on average received 11.4 percent more orders a day in the post-period relative to the 
pre-period (p<0.01). In Column 2, using the sample that only contains restaurant-days for which 
a restaurant offers supply, this effect is much larger, and we find that restaurants that offer supply 
on a given day receive 42.9 percent more orders a day in the post-period (p<0.01).  
The difference in effect size across the two samples is because the sample used in Column 1 
continues to include, post-lockdown, restaurants that were active prior to the declaration of 
shelter-in-place guidance but may have shut down online ordering (or shut down entirely) after 
following the shutdown. Thus, a number of restaurants in this sample have zero daily orders for 
all or most of the post-lockdown time window. We explore the competitive implications of these 
supply-side changes later in the paper, and in what follows, focus exclusively on the latter 
sample, since our primary interest is in restaurant-level impacts. 
We next consider heterogeneity in this effect across our five cities. We interact the post-
shutdown indicator with a binary variable for each city to calculate a city-specific effect. For this 
analysis, we focus purely on restaurants offering supply on a given day, and use the sample 
comprising only restaurant-days for which a restaurant offers supply on the Uber Eats platform 
(the same data used in Table 2, Column 2). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
Combining the baseline post-effect with the interaction effect for each city in Table 3 allows us 
to separately identify how the average count of orders per restaurant changes across cities in the 
post-period. Figure 7 illustrates these results of Table 3 further, depicting the city-specific 
marginal effects within each city during the pre-period. 
As illustrated, restaurants in San Francisco have seen the highest percentage increase in average 
daily orders. A restaurant in San Francisco that continues to offer supply on the Uber Eats 
platform following shelter-in-place guidance and was getting 10 orders a day on average prior to 
March 16 would be, on average, receiving 16 orders a day post-shelter-in-place guidance (the 
marginal effect is a 59.6 percent increase, significant at p<0.01).  Similarly, Dallas restaurants 
that remained open and available on the platform have seen average increases of 52.0 percent 
and NYC restaurants see an effect of about 45.5 percent. Restaurants in Miami have seen the 
smallest increase (21.2 percent), however, the measured effect is statistically and economically 
significant (at p<0.01) across all cities.  
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Table 3: Regression Estimate of the City-Specific Change in Daily Restaurant Orders on 
the Uber Eats Platform in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic  
 
 
 
Note: The table presents regression results that assess the variation across cities in the impact of shutdown orders on 
daily order counts on the Uber Eats platform. The variable Post takes the value 0 for all observations February 1 
through the declaration of shelter-in-place guidance in a given city, and the value 1 for all observations following the 
declaration of shelter-in-place guidance through May 1. The Post variable is interacted with an indicator variable for 
each city to construct a city-specific effect. The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of only those restaurant-
days for which the restaurant offered positive supply on that day. The dependent variable is scaled by the within-city 
pre-period mean. Both regressions use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity by restaurant and by 
day-of-week. 
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Figure 7: City-Specific Impact of Shelter-in-Place Guidance on Daily Orders on the Uber 
Eats Platform 
 
 
Note: The figure displays a bar chart displaying the city-specific marginal effect of shelter-in-place guidance on 
daily orders for restaurants offering supply on a given day. Each bar depicts, for the respective city, the percentage 
increase in average daily orders per restaurant in the post-lockdown period, relative to the average number of orders 
received by restaurants in that city during the pre-lockdown period. The error bars depict the 95% confidence 
interval. Estimates are derived from the regression results presented in Table 3. 
 
The changes we document in Uber Eats ordering activity may be due to a number of reasons. 
The absence of dine-in options may shift demand towards the online channel; variability in the 
availability of groceries and fears of going to a grocery store may induce consumers to order in 
rather than cook themselves. In contrast, an increase in the hours people have been spending at 
home coupled with health concerns associated with food prepared and delivered by people 
outside their homes could induce an increased propensity and ability to prepare one’s own meals; 
the lack of availability from one’s favorite restaurants on the platform could add to this negative 
demand effect. Our evidence indicates that, in the aggregate, these and other negative demand 
effects are significantly outweighed by the positive. 
4.2 Supply Squeeze and Competitive Effects 
The changes in restaurant supply on the platform is likely to influence whether and how a 
restaurant experiences the demand shock caused by the current pandemic. Restaurants may see 
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particularly large increases in demand and orders if their direct competitors are unable to stay 
open or provide less supply.  
In traditional markets, entry or expansion by new firms is generally associated with an increase 
in competition and profit erosion of incumbent firms (e.g., Porter, 1979). However, digital 
platform markets, such as the Uber Eats platform, are characterized by indirect network effects 
as a higher number of providers increase platform activity (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003; Weyl, 2010), which may benefit providers in the market even as competition on the 
platform increases. A small but growing body of literature has attempted to identify competitive 
dynamics in digital channels by examining the effects of competitor entry or expansion on 
incumbent performance. Considering competition between providers on the Yelp! Transactions 
Platform, Reshef (2019) finds that entry of new firms increases incumbent performance, 
especially for high-quality incumbents. Similarly, in the video game industry, Haviv et al. (2019) 
find evidence that an increase in sales of platform-exclusive games increases the performance of 
games in other genres on the platform. However, different business models across platforms may 
shape these effects extant research has yet to explore how a contraction in competitor supply, 
such as the one witnessed in our empirical setting, may affect demand.  
We next analyze how restaurant supply hours and competitive conditions influence the effect of 
the COVID-19 induced demand shock. To assess the potential moderating effect of competition 
in determining whether and how the closure of dine-in restaurants affects restaurant performance 
eon the Uber Eats platform, we first must create a measure of competition. We define each 
restaurant’s competitive set as the other restaurants within the same primary cuisine 
categorization within the city that also provide supply on the Uber Eats platform at some time 
between February 1, 2020 and May 1, 2020. Our measure of competition is the percent of 
restaurants within a category that are open on a given day. A higher value in this measure 
suggests that a consumer would have more options on the Uber Eats platform to choose from 
within that cuisine category. Figure 8 displays the distribution of the city-cuisine-day-level 
competition index pooled across all sample cities. We see the highest density of the index above 
75%.  
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Figure 8: Distribution of Competition Index 
 
 
Note: The figure displays the distribution of the cuisine-level competition index. The competition index is measured 
as the percent of restaurants in a city within a cuisine that are open on a given day. This figure charts this 
distribution of observations at the city-cuisine-day level.  
 
We use a model of the following form to estimate the role of competition in determining the 
effect of the COVID shock on restaurant performance:  𝑌!" = 𝛽#𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!" + 𝛽$𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥!" +	𝛽%𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!" ×	𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥!" +𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	𝐹𝐸! + 𝐷𝑎𝑦	𝑜𝑓	𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘	𝐹𝐸" + 𝜀        (2) 
By interacting the measure of competition with the post indicator variable, we can identify how 
the level of competition on a given day moderates the effect of dine-in restaurant closure on 
restaurant performance on the Uber Eats. By comparing the effect of our competition indicator in 
the pre- vs. post-period, we can identify whether and how the relative supply of peer restaurants 
and competitors affects the increase in restaurant demand. Our results are presented in Table 4 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
21 
Table 4: Regression Estimate of the Effect of Competition on Daily Orders on the Uber 
Eats Platform in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Note: The table presents regression results that assess the effect of competition on order counts on the Uber Eats 
platform pre- and post-shelter-in-place guidance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The variable Post takes the value 
0 for all observations February 1 through the declaration of shelter-in-place guidance in a given city, and the value 1 
for all observations following the declaration of shelter-in-place guidance through May 1. The Percent Index 
variable measures the percent of sample restaurants within a given restaurant’s cuisine category that are open on a 
given day. The Post variable and the Percent Index variable are interacted to construct a pre- and post-period effect 
of competition. The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of only those restaurant-days for which the restaurant 
offered positive supply on that day. The dependent variable is scaled by the within-city pre-period mean. Both 
regressions use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity by restaurant and by day-of-week 
 
 
The results indicate that predictably, competition has a negative effect in both the pre- and post-
period. However, the effects of competition are stronger in the post-period. In Column 2, our 
results suggest that a ten percent increase in the number of restaurants open within a cuisine 
category decreases the orders a restaurant receives by 5.14% in the pre-period (at p<0.01), while 
the equivalent increase in the number of restaurants open within a cuisine category would 
decrease the count of orders a restaurant receives by 6.35% (at p<0.01). To illustrate this 
difference, in Figure 9, we chart the effects of competition in the pre- and post-period. 
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Figure 9: Effect of Competition on Daily Orders on the Uber Eats Platform in Response to 
the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Note: The figure displays the effect of competition on daily restaurant orders pre- and post-shelter-in-place 
guidance. Competition as measured as the percent of sample restaurants within a cuisine category that are offer 
supply on the Uber Eats platform on a given day. The y-axis measures the percent change in daily orders, and the 
zero value of the y-axis represents the count of orders that a restaurant would receive in the pre-period with no 
competition. Estimates are derived from the regression results presented in Table 4.   
 
Figure 9 illustrates that the increase in orders associated with the post-period differs depending 
on the level of competition within a cuisine category. For example, if twenty-five percent of 
restaurants are open within a cuisine category in both the pre- and post-period, per-restaurant 
daily order levels grow by 34.88% post-shelter-in-place guidance compared to pre-shelter-in-
place guidance. On the other hand, if seventy-five percent of restaurants are open within a 
cuisine category in both the pre- and post-period, per-restaurant daily order levels grow by 
28.82% in the post- vs. pre-period. The increase in orders received thus reflects changes both to 
restaurant supply (i.e., competition) as well as consumer demand for delivery. 
These results suggest an interesting contrast between what is best for the platform and what is 
best for providers on the platform. As shown in Figure 6, the more restaurants that are on the 
platform, the greater total consumer activity on the platform is. However, as demonstrated in 
Table 4, it is clear that more competition on the platform appear to decrease the count of orders 
each restaurant can expect to receive. An open question regards whether this substitution across 
competition may be offset over longer periods of time by indirect network effects if a greater 
number of providers brings more consumers to the platform. Nevertheless, digital platforms must 
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navigate this tension in attempting to manage both the consumer and supplier-side of the 
platform, and this represents a promising area for future work.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As the COVID-induced lockdown of Spring 2020 winds down, “business-as-usual” has been 
transformed. In particular, there is likely to be a significant and permanent shift away from in-
person commerce and towards digital interaction. The impacts have been across sectors---the 
apparel and accessories stores experienced a year-over-year decline of 89.3% in April 2020, 
which while understandable given shelter-in-place and people working from home, is still 
staggering, perhaps the biggest YoY decline in any sector ever, and an inflection point that 
signals the future dominance of ecommerce in this sector.  
While numerous restaurants have already closed their doors for good, those that emerge from the 
shutdown will be the ones which were able to best leverage digital channels. The connection 
between platform-sourced demand and survival will be indelible, likely leading the survivors to 
double down on digital, seeing it as a critical source of resilience. Because of social distancing, 
enhanced cleaning protocols, and consumer hesitancy, the costs of dine-in will increase 
significantly, making a digital channel all but essential for restaurant survival.   
All of these factors point to the heightened importance of platforms like Uber Eats in the 
economy of the future. Our findings provide insight into the details and dynamics of the role that 
such platforms play in mitigating the adverse effects of negative economic shocks, underscoring 
the risks associated with policy that may curtail their growth or reach, while also shedding new 
light on the different economic factors at play when a business sells through a platform.  
We are currently analyzing heterogeneity in restaurant impacts following the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic---how performance on the platform prior to the onset of the pandemic 
moderates the shock, and whether there is a “long tail” effect that amplifies benefits to niche or 
less popular restaurants. Longer term, unpacking the relative impacts of the supply-side and 
demand-side shocks that we have documented, perhaps as part of a more detailed modeling 
exercise, represents an interesting direction for deeper analysis.  
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